Lebanon is mostly described as an incomplete democracy where democratic competition and power struggles by democratic means are limited. As an example, activities outside official channels are undertaken such as supporting protests, riots, and even “militia warfare”. These practices were heavily engaged by political parties and other sectarian leaders to increase their power within the political system (Cammett & Issar, 2010). The consociational systems of the Lebanese government are made so that there is a fair representation within the system. However, this is improbable to represent all of the people because the power is usually concentrated among specific groups of elites that ignore grassroots concerns when consociational victory is declared (Dixon, 2011). This encourages segregation and limits the chances of intergroup conflict resolution. Especially since the post-Syria war where democratic transitions resulted in elections divided the country into four tightly-knit, closed sectarian communities within a confessional cantonization between the Shi’a by the Hezbollah-Amal alliance, the Sunnis by Sa’d al-Hariri, the Druze by Jumblatt, and the Maronites led b ‘Awn and a crowd of lesser represented political leaders (Salloukh, 2009).

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During this time, the Christian political establishment was ostracized politically, tipping the balance of political power in favour of the Sunni and Shi’a political elites. This implies a narrowed view of ethnicity, which disregards the various social spaces engaged by individuals. It encourages the strong potential for unequal distribution of resources between groups despite consociationalism promoting otherwise (Wilkinson, 2000). Additionally, when a religious sect has a majority in a constituency, they may specify “the election of candidates supposedly representing another sect without them necessarily having the backing of their own sect” due to the political structure of Lebanon (Worrall, Mabon & Chubb, 2015). This compels sects that are stretched wide and thin to be represented by candidates not of their own choosing or even members of ‘rival factions’. It affects the distribution of Lebanon’s Christian populations which heavily favours the Hezbollah. The country’s endorsement of consociationalism conveys the message of the importance of religious confession as a factor to its citizens when taking into account political representations and positions, not their credibility.

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This brings us to the analysis of elite conflict within authoritarian regimes or even incomplete democracies such as Lebanon. The politics and conflict of the elite bring about instability within the coalitions as differences over aims, policies and survival strategies manifest a weak regime vulnerable to external pressures (Smith, 2013). Predominantly, the Hezbollah remains to be a dominant actor within Lebanon’s political system possessing a huge social movement and having one of the most potent militias and influence of political culture in the Middle East (Nagle, 2016). Seeberg (2009) demonstrates the political reality of Lebanon is distinguished by a ‘dual power’ position, with Prime Minster Fouad Siniora leading the alliance and Hezbollah as the opposition on the other side. The main premise of a ‘dual power’ situation is when a legitimate yet fragile government has a strong, self-appointed power centre which in this case is Hezbollah. Essentially, Hezbollah is just another Lebanese political actor, it is a political party that pursues power by being in the Parliament and has gained much popularity and political legitimacy due to its effective political work (and extensive social activities among poor Shi’ites in Lebanon). However, the political party is also a religious movement that portrays a Khomeini-inspired version of Shi’ism which is demonstrated in the rhetoric of the Hezbollah leaders Nasrallah and Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah in speeches, on television, and on the internet via Al Manar. This movement garnered its legitimacy by making references to the Quran and the ideals of Shi’ism within its religiously focused activities. It gives Hezbollah a privileged status or superiority when compared to other political actors in Lebanon. Although Lebanon is not counted as an authoritarian state, the power of this one political actor demonstrates the obstacles to democracy promotion and the incomplete democracy that is presented in the parliament.

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Furthermore, aside from the influence of the Hezbollah, there presents to be an individual that drastically changed the political system of Lebanon. According to Salloukh (2009), Rafiq al-Hariri who formed his first cabinet on October 31, 1992, with Syrian blessing, soon discovered that Damascus would not allow the emergence of a viable post-war consociational democracy regulated by the constitutional provisions enshrined in the Ta’if Accord. This enabled the presidency to regain its pre-Ta’if position in the political system, forsaking cabinet as the chief executive consociational institution; it also negated the principle of separation of powers consecrated in Ta’if. This gave Syria and its allies control over the state’s legislative institution. Allowing constitutional procedures to be ignored, especially those pertaining to the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon and limits on presidential tenures. Hariri’s presidency has sparked the use of the Ta’if agreement for a consociational democracy. This is why his assassination on February 144, 2005, created a domestic, regional, and international tidal wave that forced Syrian troops out of Lebanon on April 25, 2005. This in turn created great expectations for a post-Syria democratic transition in Lebanon, which gave birth to a more assertive and chauvinistic sectarianism, replacing the outpouring of nationalist sentiments witnessed following the assassination (Salloukh, 2009).

 

Hariri’s assassination and the political changes that followed have caused most Lebanese to have a sense of nationalism towards their country but have yet to demonstrate their will to build a democratic Lebanon through liberal means beyond the narrow sectarian loyalties and external agendas. Failing this challenge will only consecrate the primacy of the sectarian system at the expense of proper democratic standards in Lebanon.

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Furthermore, the incomplete democracy presented in Lebanon could amount to corruption heavily linked to political classes. The use of a centralized government encourages the concentration of power between the political elites which creates an environment of instability and informality where the distribution of power is further increased by the sectarian system (Stel & Naudé, 2016). This promotes an informal clientelist governmental system where disagreements between political elites occur commonly due to underlying schemes where elites are looking for beneficial situations that could bring advantages for their sect (Clapham, 1984). It fosters a power exchange system that depends on mutually beneficial behind-the-scenes deals with individuals or groups. Additionally, it discourages democracy by shutting down citizen participation and places the interest of the political group and sects to be primary when compared to the societal needs of the people (Hasse, 2017). Moreover, failure to hold civil servants accountable for their actions manifests situations that encourage the use of corrupt means for personal gain and as a result, fosters the spread of corruption across various public sectors till the government could no longer control it.

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Consequently, this creates an environment where the government is not trusted by the citizens to provide basic services. Public officials become notorious to offer uneven access to resources for political favour (Ibid) as a result of the clientelist nature of Lebanese politics. A study done by Stel and Naudé (2016) demonstrated that Electricité du Liban (EDL), a state-owned electric company does not charge the citizens of Lebanon equally or effectively, frequently resulting in citizens having to pay an excessive fee to obtain basic service from the government and generators from private companies as a result of the regular power outages. However, the company has been seen as providing free electricity to political elites and their supporters. Additionally, in the case of banking Chaaban (2016) found that out of 20 banks, 15 had a chair of the board linked to a politician, while six on the board held public office. Even more so when bribery becomes profoundly ingrained in Lebanese culture that it is seen as a necessity to start or continue the business. It was reported that in order to obtain a government contract, 67% of firms would need to pay a bribe, with it accounting for about eight percent of the value of the contract they were receiving (Helou, 2019). In these cases, services then become “a political favour, not a public right,” reinforcing negative emotions and actions among citizens and further reinforcing corruption within the political sphere.

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“Democracy,” “liberalism,” “equality”, “unity,” “peace,” and “prosperity” are related terms; they are all desirable qualities for a country, but they are not the same thing. Significantly the existence of democracy does not guarantee any of those qualities, democracies could still go to war and have an intense division of politics, nor are democracies immune from economic downturns and stagnation. Lebanon being counted as an “incomplete democracy” does not make them undeserving of the peace and prosperity every country is deserved for. Democracy is not a sure-fire system that would automatically alleviate all problems within a country, it is best understood only as a political system that is effective at avoiding or precluding authoritarianism